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Pervasive Problems of Governing: An Analytic Framework
By definition, governing is a matter of oonfronting and
coping with a very wide ränge of problems. Analytically, the
idea of ungovernability is a nonsense. The question is not
whether we shall be governed but how. A modern Western society
can no more do without the authority of government than it could
do without money as a medium of exchange. Ungovernability can
be only a temporary phase of anarchy in the career of a political
System, followed by the establishment of a new regime or the re-
establishment of the regime under challenge.
Just as optimism was the mood of the 1960s, so pessimism
about government has become widespread in the 1970s. In a calm,
deliberate analysis of the putative waning of the welfare state,
Fritz Scharpf foresees "social change of an order of magnitude
which is comparable to the transition from laissez faire capitalism
to the welfare state half a Century ago".1 Samuel P.Huntington
argues that in this new era, "postindustrial politics could be
the darker side of post industrial sooiety", and chastises
social scientists for averting their gaze from this prospect
o
simply because it is "unpleasant". Citizens as well as scholars
express nervousness about the future. A survey in nine nations
of the European Community in autumn 1977 found people were almost
twice as likely to fear social tensions leading to civil disorder
in the next decade as to fear the outbreak of a third world war.
The median Briton reckoned there was an almost 50-50 Chance of
civil disorder in the years ahead, and the median German the
same.'
Notwithstanding prognoses of imminent doom, no Western
regime has collapsed in the 1970s or been replaced by a coup, as
was the Fourth Prench Republic in 1958. But the survival of a
regime is not proof that its contemporary authority is the same
as twenty or fifty years ago. Regimes can change significantly
in character--for better or worse--without a complete constit-
utional breakdown. To believe that governing in the 1980s will
be easy and congenial is to presuppose that there is a 'hidden
hand' mechanism automatically maintaining political authority in
a desirable equilibrium.
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The object of this article is to identify in clear
analytic terms pervasive Problems that could threaten the political
authority of Western governments today. The first section defines
the concept of political authority and distinguishes those problems
that are central to authority. The next two sections consider
whether in contemporary circumstances perennial problems of
allocating resources and government Organisation raise new
challenges to political authority. Questions of political consent
are considered in sections that deal withvalue conflict, and with
civic indifference. The concluding section speculates about the
Chief meta-problem of political authority today: whether chall¬
enges to the effectiveness of government undermine political
consent as well?
IV POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE POLICY PROCESS
Logically, the first stage in analysis is the definition
of terms. Political authority concerns persisting and pervasive
relationships between governors and governed.11 It has two
elements, effectiveness and consent. An Organisation that
cannot effectively influence the society around it is not a
government. A government that acts without the consent of the
governed is not government as we like to think of it in the
Western world today. Those who write about ungovernability
address both these concerns; some emphasise a putative decline
of effectiveness, others are worried about the possible loss of
consent, and a third group sees political authority threatened
on both counts.
Effectiveness is the first concern of governors.
Government is not only about good intentions; it is also about
getting things done. To be effective in society, a government
must be able to raise and allocate resources to meet its commit-
ments of public policy. In addition, a government must be able
to organise the complex maze of institutions that constitute the
modern State. A government is more or less effective, depend-
ing upon the resources and Organisation it commands. Whereas
technocracy was once thought capable of indefinite extension in
the Service of the post-industrial State, today there is a crisis
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of confidence in technique. In Scharpf's diagnosis, government•s
effectiveness has declined because of the "cumulation and inter-
relatedness of problems and the interdependence of Solutions...
Avoiding the crisis of ungovernability means, above all, avoid-
ing the disappointment, frustration and disaffeotion resulting
from visible policy failures".
Consent is the most important political concern of
Citizens in contemporary Western nations. In contemporary
Western societies, individuals cannot be oonditioned auto-
matically to do whatever government commands. A given dis-
tribution of values in society affects consent, for the exist-
ence among social groups of politically salient non-bargainable
value conflicts will deprive government of füll normative
support. The consent of Citizens is also registered in behav-
iour: Citizens may comply with basic political laws: as in
Northern Ireland, consciously defy them, or register indiffer-
ence toward the lawful manifestation of political authority.
Civic indifference can be as debilitating to governmental effect¬
iveness (and far less risky on the part of individuals) than
resort to organised or unorganised -protest.
Consent and effectiveness are inter-related, for the
success of any public policy requires the co-operation of affected
Citizens. If this co-operation is given voluntarily or if
Citizens respond positively to appropriate Programme incentives,
then policies are more likely to be effective and efficient.
The participation of Citizens is contingent, not certain. It
is far easier to encourage participation in programmes dispensing
cash benefits, such as pensions, than in programmes that impose
costs upon those involved, such as a wage freeze.
The ideal government is a fully legitimate authority,
enjoying both the consent of Citizens and effectiveness in action.
Fear of losing political legitimacy is the most important under-
lying theme of writings about 'ungovernability'. A repudiated
regime, without effectiveness or consent, can be consigned to the
ranks of historical has beens. A regime under challenge may
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adapt policies and institutions to maintain both consent and
effectiveness, or it may give first priority to one at the cost
of the other. A regime that sacrifices effectiveness for
consent may survive, but it can hardly carry out the programmes
of a.contemporary mixed economy welfare State. A regime that
loses populär oonsent but still retains effectiveness could use
the threat of coercion to carry out its policies; this is the
customary form of government in Eastern Europe today, as well as
in Western Europe in days past.
Because political legitimacy is usually taken for
granted, at least in the Anglo-American world, there is no
institution concentrating upon the defence of political author-
ity. In Continental countries, where authority has not been
taken for granted, there is an old tradition of placing internal
security first, and consciously policing to maintain order.
Today chief executives appear to worry more about international
than internal threats to the authority of their regime.
Problems of effectiveness are immediate, whereas those
of eonsent are typically latent. Every senior politician or
bureaucrat has an in-tray füll of problems arising from resource
constraints or organisational limits upon the effectiveness of
government. In fortunate times and places when consent can be
taken for granted, it poses no problem for attention. But a
question of consent may surface If, for example, a protest group
challenges a law, or if government itself contemplates legis-
lation that may be against the interests of strategically placed
groups, e.g. legislation regulating strikes.
The effectiveness of government is immediately at issue
in two stages of the policy process. At a given point in time,
a government must relate its policy commitments (both those of
its own volition, and the cumulative sum of its predecessors'
choices) to national resources (e.g. gross national product,
Population, mineral and energy supplies, etc.). Resources
should not be judged by some absolute Standard, but in relation
to policy commitments. In addition, a government must direct,
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control and guide its institutions to convert resources into
programmes producing Outputs intended to realise manifold policy
commitments. ßiving overall direction is not easy, for govern-
ment is not a single Institution, but a congeries of organisations
with more or less functionally specific Programme responsibilities
and resources.
This paper is not concerned with effectiveness for its
own sake, as is the literature of public administration. Effect¬
iveness is of particular concern here insofar as it threatens to
spill over to undermine consent as well. The consent of Citizens
affects the policy process in two ways. If groups of Citizens
make demands based upon conflicting non-bargainable values, the
resulting conflict threatens the rejection of government's Claim
to be the final authority to resolve social differences. North¬
ern Ireland is an extreme example of a society without an effect-
ive political authority, because of a non-bargainable value
conflict within its population. But Citizen demands and responses
do not need to feed back into the political System in a conflictual
or consensual manner; they may also feed out, that is, Citizens
may become indifferent to government, looking to other institutions
of society to secure their wants.
Time is the fundamental axis of the policy profess, for
programmes of government, whatever their origins, tend to persist.
Without invoking all that is implied in the term catastrophe
theory, current concern with political authority emphasises that
the future cannot be assumed simply to reflect the persistence of
the past. The persistence of past behaviour may lead to a
reversal of fortunes; for example, continuous growth in energy
consumption can intensify future problems of energy supplies.
Within the policy process, there are four points at
which it is specially relevant to look for trends that could
alter political authority. The first concerns the relationship
between commitments and resources; if the latter are not adequate
to meet the Claims of the former, then effectiveness will diminish
efficiency and effectiveness. Thirdly, if the Outputs of govern-
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ments are in conflict with values of a significant fraction of a
Society, consent will diminish. If the Outputs of government
stimulate indifference rather than compliance, consent will also
diminish.
II THE BALANCE OP RESOURCES: Piscal Dividend or Overload?
In the era of undoubted affluence, national resources
were meant to be the solution rather than the cause of political
difficulties. An ever growing national product, itself reflect-
ing an ever more sophisticated level of societal Organisation,
was meant to provide both quick technological fixes for immediate
difficulties, and ever increasing abundance for all.
Statute books enshrine past spending commitments. The
inertia commitments of government are the chief determinant of a
government's need for money. The decisions that a government
makes during its term of Office have far less effect upon total
public expenditure than the cumulative and virtually uncontroll-
able decisions of its predecessors. Many laws cannot be repealed
without violating an implicit contract with Citizens, e.g. old
age pensions. Others, such as education, cannot be repealed
without creating hostility among those providing a public service
as well as it- recipients. The permanence of government organ-
isations not only entrenches the commitments of government, but
also is a force promoting increasing expenditure.
In the contemporary mixed economy weifare State, the
causes of increasing costs of public policy are of three main
types. Consumers of welfare benefits can push up public
spending by a growth in the numbers receiving a given Programme,
or by demanding more and better public Services. Producers of
public goods and Services, ranging from social workers to the
military, are strategically placed spending libbies within govern¬
ment. A growth in the supply of tax revenue, whether caused by
real economic growth or inflation, can also lead to greater public
spending.
In the 1950s and 1960s economic growth everywhere
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produced a fiscal dividend, supplying greater tax revenues to
government without any increase in tax rates. Qovernments
expanded welfare programmes providing major benefits to most
Citizens in childhood, ill health and retirement. Simul-
taneously, individual take-home pay rose. Daniel Bell has
argued that economic growth has been "a political solvent",
providing the means of "financing social welfare expenditures
and defence without reallocating income (always a politically
difficult matter) or burdening the poor (which has become an
equally difficult affair)".
Past success threatens future effectiveness, for the
costs of public policy have been growing at a faster rate than
the economy as a whole. Prom 1951 through 1977, the costs of
public policy have been growing at an average of 7-1 per cent
in six major Western nations—Britain, France, Germany, Italy
Sweden and the United States. Concurrently, the national
economies have grown at an average annual rate of 4.2 per cent.
In decades past, the costs of public policy could grow faster,
because the total cost was a limited fraction of the national
product. Por example, when government claimed only one-quarter
of the national product, the average annual growth of 7.1 per
cent in total government spending anticipated a 1.8 per cent
growth in the economy as a whole. But when the costs of
governing are equivalent to 50 per cent of the national product,
this anticipates an aimual growth in the economy of more than
3.5 per cent. In the 1970s, Western economies have grown more
slowly than before, (an annual average of 2.4 per cent) while
the costs of public policy have continued to rise as before.
Every major Western government now faces the risk that the
growing costs of public policy may consume all the fiscal
dividend of economic growth, and then some.
Overloading the political economy immediately threatens
a loss of effectiveness and efficiency. A loss of effectiveness
follows if a government makes commitments in excess of resources;
it must meet this real deficit by causing a few programmes to
abort or fail through gross underfunding, or alternatively by
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'undernourishing many programmes, cutting spending on capital
maintenance and staffing. Government is losing efficiency, as
it finds it increasingly costly to reduce unemployment by one
percentage point, or to reduce inflation by a similar amount.
Government loses effectiveness too, when orthodox Keynesian
economic measures fail to reduce either inflation or unemployment.
Given that the shortfall between commitments and resources is
only a small Proportion of its total national produet, the loss
is likely to be marginal, that is, 'only' a few billions of pounds,
or tens of billions of dollars or Deutsche Marks.
The introduction of wage and price controls in response
to the Problems of an overloaded economy could stimulate value
dissent in place of eonsent in countries such as Britain, where
government is not normally regarded as a legitimate arbiter of
wages and prices. To prevent the loss of eonsent, governments
often build in provisions for ineffectiveness, with such safety
valves as wages drift through shop-floor produetivity bargaining,
price increases in response to rising import costs, and an
emphasis upon the temporary nature of controls.9 These safety
valves reduce government's effectiveness, but help preserve
eonsent to authority, for the market pathologies of controls are
not sustained long enough to stimulate a severe economic reaction,
and interest groups are not asked to comply indefinitely with
policies in fundamental conflict with their immediate market
interests.
Citizen indifference is the other possible consequence of
government overloading the political economy. If the costs of
public policy grow more than the national produet, government's
lawful Claim to tax the first fruits of economic growth will
cause a cut in real take-home pay, that is, post-tax pre-transfer
income. The past quarter-century has shown that Citizens are
ready to aeeept a smaller share of the national produet as take-
home pay, when it is increasing in absolute real terms. Just as
workers resist more strongly an employer who tries to cut real
wages than an employer who refuses a real increase, so Citizens
can be expected to react more strongly against a government that
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euts instead of protects their take-home pay.
Prom 1970 through
1977, the world recession and increasing public spending
have
caused take-home pay to fall in at
least one year in every major
Western nation, in three years in Britain and Italy,
and in four
years out of seven
in Sweden. Projections from the past 25 years
indicate that there is a real risk of take-home pay undergoing
a
secular deoline in Italy, Britain and Sweden,
unless governments
alter past trends in economic growth
and/or in the growth of public
spending. The risk is less immediate
in America, Germany and
France, though much depends in
the German case upon assuming
another period of rapid econcmic growth to
offset the relative
economic Stagnation of the 1970s, and the continued steady grcwth
in the costs of public policy.
Civic indifference is a cheap, easy and readily
available
substitute for the rebellion implicit in value conflict.
In¬
different Citizens do not need to make an
active show of defiance
of authority. Instead, they need only ignore it,
withdrawing
from the field in which government is dominant.
Citizens can
register their indifference by tax
avoidance and tax evasion,
immediate and direct remedies for the probl^m of falling
take-
home pay, albeit remedies that
externalise costs onto government.
III THE ORGANISATION OP GOVERNMENT:
Productive or Counter-
Productive?
By definition, the government of
a modern State is a
complex Organisation capable of undertaking
a wide variety of
different and difficult activities. A high level
of institut-
ionalisation is essential for maintaining order
in any society,
especially contemporary societies.
In any long-term historical
perspective, the productive capacity
of contemporary government—
that is, its ability to get things done
that were unthinkable a
Century or more ago-is undeniable.
But there is no necessary
reason to believe that the effectiveness
of government increases
in a linear manner. Whereas the organisational capacity
of
government was once seen as a
means to the end of resolving
society's problems, today its
institutions are often attacked
as part of the problem.
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Since Organisation affects political authority in a
limited number of respects, many of the complaints currently
being voiced about 'big' government are not relevant here. The
debate about market versus governmental allocation of society's
resources concerns the efficienoy not the legitimacy of govern¬
ment. Political controversies about the growth of government
organisations are normally concerned with familiär and per-
sisting conflicts of interest, and not questions of political
authority per se. Complaints about the costs of government
are not relevant to political authority, for the crucial question
about resources is relative; what is the ratio between growing
costs and growth in the national product?
Many of the Problems of contemporary government Organ¬
isation conoern efficiency, not effectiveness. The former can
undermine the latter only in extreme cases, when efficiency has
declined so much that an increasing commitment of resources
lowers productivity in absolute and not just relative terms.
The growth in government, cannot be condemned as inefficient by
invoking a priori assumptions about the economies or diseconomies
of scale. Systematic surveys of evidence show that neither
assumption is necessarily true.12
The growth of public expenditure has not made government
less efficient, for a disproportionate share of this growth is
accounted for by an expansion of cash transfer payments,
especially old age pensions. The ease with which eligibility
criteria are established for pensions means that all government
need do is write cheques, and government is a relatively efficient
cheque-writing machine. Spending more money on education or
health is not ipso facto likely to lead to increased inefficiency,
for both Services are highly decentralized, and the bulk of
money goes to those directly providing Services to clients:
teachers, doctors and hospital staff.
The growth in the number of public sector employees
in every Western nation does not necessarily make government less
efficient. The growth in personnel has tended to occur among
.the more educated and presumptively skilled (e.g., teachers,
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doctors and hospital staff.
The growth in the number of public sector employees
in
every Western nation does not necessarily
make government less
efficient. The growth in personnel has tended to
occur among
the more educated and presumptively skilled (e.g., teachers,-
health Service employees, sooial workers, etc.) or by
the
transfer of industrial production workers from private to public
payrolls. In many countries there has
been a decline in the
Proportion of the labour force in the military,
a Service
difficult to evaluate for effectiveness in the absence
of war,
and often criticised for lack of efficiency.
The growth of government can be expected
to reduce
efficiency, at least marginally, because of the need
to co-
ordinate a larger and more heterogeneous number
of organisations
undertaking Programme objectives. The twentieth Century
growth of government has not been just
a simple expansion in
the scale of existing hierarchical integrated organisations.
It has also involved an explosion in the structure of govern¬
ment, at central, regional and local
levels and outside normal
departmental structures as well. President
Carter's re-organ-
isation team required 45 pages to produce a one-line-per-agency
description of the executive branch. Having
done this, the
Compilers caution:
It is important to emphasise that this categorisation
of organisational elements does not constitute an
exhaustive accounting of the whole federal government.
Rather, its purpose is to establish a
definition of the
executive branch for the re-organisation process. We
anticipate changes as the re-organisation study groups
learn more about the executive branch.^
As the size of a given bureau or department increases,
there is a disproportionate increase in the number of layers
through which Communications must pass
and the number of
clearances required to undertake any action of consequence.
Moreover, as a given bureau or department combines
more special-
ists and specialist tasks, there is an increase
in the number
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of clearances among interdependent groups concerned with a given-
programme. One study of the flow of work within the federal
executive branch in Washington found that in more than two-thirds
of the oases examined, one bureau's action was simply an input
to another agency within the government.1''
The 'ageing' of government programmes and organisations
can further inhibit effectiveness, for they survive by a kind
of mortmain. The creation of new government programmes and
bureaux without the termination of older commitments and units
makes contemporary government an amalgam of activities created
'in response to past conditions that may no longer obtain; of
activities with continuing contemporary relevance; and of new
activities meant to be implemented in an environment that is
already densely populated by previously established programmes.
The prior Claims to jurisdiction of established organisations
must be accepted as part of the price of introducing a new
Programme. 'Ageing' can lead to 'overinstitutionalisation',
in which pluralistic Stagnation results.
The growth in the number of government programmes
threatens to reduce government's effectiveness, insofar as it
increases the probability that the actions of one bureau will
contradict those of another. Contradictions among social
preferences are not new. What is new is that government is
increasingly expected to internalise these contradietions.
In the words of a Prench Student of public administration,
"l'administration est ainsi conduite ä interioriser l'ensemble
des conflicts sociaux de la socie"te\ Reproduisant ces conflicts
en son sein, eile les transforme en conflicts bureaucratiques".1^
The effectiveness of government will decline, insofar
as new programmes tend to seek objectives beyond the means of
government (or any formal Organisation) to achieve unilaterally
by its own actions. At one time governments concentrated
primarily upon activities for which there were known organ-
isational technologies, such as building roads, training
soldiers or teaching the essentials of reading, writing and
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arithmetic. The growth of government's activities
in the post¬
war era has involved it in trying to influenoe complex processes
of interaction that it cannot control.
Governments have
increasingly adopted progranmes intended
to reduce or remove
social pathology, e.g., crime, poverty or
mental illness, but
social scientists cannot provide clear cause-and-effect
modeis
of social change, or, insofar as causes
can be identified (e.g.,
the family) they are not readily amenable
to control by acts of
public policy.
The growth of government has involved
more people as




increase the responsiveness of government to diverse
interests
within society. At a minimum, this increases
the time it takes
government to act. Insofar
as participants become veto groups,
not only objecting to proposals of government
but also to pro-
posals put forward by other participants
in consultations,
increased participation can also limit the effectiveness
of
government.
While the loss of governmental efficiency is costly,
these costs may be acceptable as part
of the 'overhead' of
government. In an imperfect world,
no government can operate
without some inefficiency. Por example,
the American Office
of Management and Budget estimates
that paperwork for federal
reporting requires up to 785 million
hours annually, the
equivalent in effort of approximately 470,000
fulltime employees.
In societal terms, the labour requirement
is less than one half of
one per cent of
America1s total labour force. It is up
to
politicians in Congress, not efficiency experts,
to determine
whether this cost is too much or
worthwhile in relation to what-
ever benefits are produced by regulation.
Organisational inefficiency and
ineffectiveness might
indirectly threaten political authority,
if the' aggregate costs
of organisational inadequacies forced governmental
spending
Upward at a rate that is greater
than the growth of the national
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product itself. In a country such as Italy, where government
Organisation makes control of public expenditure very diffioult,
this could oonceivably happen. But Italy is an extreme or
deviant example of the State. Moreover, the overcommitment of
resources is so widespread, threatening Sweden and Britain as
well as Italy, that it cannot be explained away as a consequence
of inefficienoy.
Organisational ineffectiveness can induce civic
indifference. If Citizens find that government organisations.
do not produce what is intended, this is likely to encourage
people to stop relying upon government to provide for their
needs, turning instead to the private seotor (e.g., the shift
from public transport to private motoring) or from one public
sector agency (e.g., labour intensive post Office) to another
(e.g., the highly mechanised telephone Service). Once polit-
icians conclude that they are relatively powerless to give
•
effective direction to government, they too may become in¬
different to its policies, substituting concern with their own
personal Status for organisational power.
Value conflict does not arise from organisational growth
p_er se_, but only from government adopting programmatic goals
that an Organisation cannot resolve by consent. In certain
circumstances, increasing organisational complexity may reduce
rather than stimulate value conflict. A government may adopt
an ineffective policy to avoid the value conflict likely to
arise if it acted effectively against those who refused consent
to a given policy. For example, the liberum veto institutions
of the European Community, are not designed to secure efficiency,
or to maximise effectiveness. Instead, they are designed to
maximise consent, for the Community is organised to promote
"mutual accommodation and problem-solving in a political rather
than a technocratic manner".
"^
IV VALUES: Harmony or Conflict?
While the effectiveness of government is a perennial
concern, political consent is so taken for granted that it is
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only of concern to elites or masses when challenged.
In con-
temporary Western political Systems, political institutions
are
intended to see that what government does will reoeive the
voluntary consent of Citizens. Citizens give consent to govern¬
ment without giving 100 per aent endorsement to every action that
it takes. A government can maintain füll consent as long as
populär support for the regime is stronger than differences
of
opinion about particular issues of the day. Specific policies
of a government only occasionally give politive expression to
consensual values of society. More often, policies are simply
'not inconsistent' with fundamental political values. As long
as policies do not violate cultural norms or directly affect
values divisive within society, there is no need for a large
and complex government to suffer any challenges to its political
authority.
Value conflicts arise only as and when government seeks
to act against a group that is so strongly committed to a given
goal that its members are not prepared to settle differences by
political bargaining within the rules of the regime. Non-
bargainable issues have three distinct properties. The first
is that they are zero-sum so that the realisation
of one group's
goal, for example, racial segregation, would mean
defeat for
others favouring racial integration. Secondly, when value
conflicts concern collective goods, all must share in the
decisions made; in such circumstances, "he who says collective
goods says public evils".21 A third characteristic of non-
bargainable conflict is that protagonists State their views as
absolute ends: they are not means to other ends, such as winning
votes or gaining Office, nor can they be traded off for other
benefits. Absolute values are advanced without regard for
their consequences to authority structures: fiat justitia,
ruant coeli.
The causes of historic value conflicts can be found in
non-bargainable differences about religion, language and
national identity, and race. Paith in religion as an absolute
and dominant value of society has declined within Churches as
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as well as within society at large, as is demonstrated by clergy-
men who denounce sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland as
'unchristian1, forgetting the very ground of their being. The
movement of armies across the landmass of europe in the two great
wars of this Century and the collapse of polyglot Empires has
done much to homogenise languages within nations, if not between
them. Quebec and Brüssels are today the Chief points at which
disagreement about language could readily give rise to non-
bargainable value conflicts. While a variety of groups in
Western countries today Claim distinctive national identities,
most do not challenge authority and those that do can be ignored
politically on the principle of d£ minimis_.22
While economic differences are perennial, they are not
ipso facto a basis for value conflict. Economic differences
are typically expressed in money terms. It is easy to bargain
about the division of money rewards, because money, unlike
language or national identity, is infinitely divisible. More-
over, when there is a fiscal dividend from economic growth,
differences can be resolved by outcomes in which all particip-
ants gain, both in take-home pay and in public policies.
Economic differences threaten political authority as and when
they may be translated into disputes about the power of the
regime, for example, about whether all Citizens ought to accept
government regulation of wages or redistribution of income. In
times of pressure upon resources, imprudent government policies
could create a value conflict; for that reason, governments are
unlikely to adopt such policies wittingly.
European election returns indicate little support for
political parties representing values that cannot be reconciled
with the Status quo. The Italian Communist Party and the Prench
Communists have proclaimed their acceptance of the regime in
which they live, leaving only very small revolutionary parties
of the left to proclaim old goals of combat. Nationalists
have been overall weak. By definition, a territorially based
secessionist party has a limited appeal nationwide; it may even,
like Plaid cymru in Wales, divide members of its nation,
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constituting a minority within it.
Public opinion surveys show little populär support for
a revolutionary assault upon authority in furtherance of
absolute values. Surveys carried out in the member-nations of
the European Community consistently find small proportions—
in autumn, 1977 only six per oent—endorsing unconstitutional
(that is, revolutionary) change.
*
The majority (55 per oent
in 1977) consistently favour changing society by gradualist
means. While there are armed terrorist groups rejecting the
regimes of various Continental countries, they do not divide
their societies, but father, as in Italy, unite virtually all
Citizens in defence of public order.
The emergence of a basic value conflict reduces Citizen
indifference, mobilising a population by polarising it into
groups in Opposition to each other. This is most immediately
the case when value conflicts arise about quasi-ascriptive
social characteristics, for everyone is assigned to a linguistic,
racial or religious group, and implicated in the political
conflict. Political consciousness is heightened if apolitical
individuals suddenly find that they are treated as members of
a given group, and are driven to support a cause with which they
share a common primordial identification. Only by a conscious
act of counter-identification, itself requiring a high level of
involvement, can an individual maintain civic indifference in a
society so divided politically.
If value conflicts become intense, a government can try
to avoid jeopardising consent by abandoning a given policy, thus
diminishing the scope of its effectiveness. Alternatively, it
may try to maintain effectiveness by adopting coercion to secure
compliance. Governments of Eastern Europe demonstrate that it
is possible to govern by coercing those with dissident values--
but coercive authority is hardly acceptable to governors or
governed in the Western world today.
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V CIVIC BEHAVIOUR: Compliance, Conflict or Indifference?
A conflict-oriented approach to political authority
allows only two alternatives: Citizens comply with basic laws,
whether voluntarily or by coercion, or eise they openly defy
authority. There is, however, an important third alternative:
Citizens can be indifferent to what government commands.
Citizen indifference is a sign of a lack of loyalty that is not
manifested in voice.
When value conflicts arise, indifferent Citizens
withdraw from the fray, turning their backs upon authority
and shrugging their shoulders in surprise that some people
take politics so seriously. They disinvest in their role as
Citizens, turning instead to other roles—parent,spouse,
friend or economic man.
Indifference cripples political authority without
causing it to collapse. Apathetic Citizens may positively
support authority and their low level of political involvement
can even make government work more efficiently. But this-
is true only as long as government requires passive co-
operation. Many programmes of government today require the
active collaboration of Citizens. Indifferent Citizens may
be ready to collaborate in the consumption of welfare benefits,
but not in paying for them through taxes. When apathy has a
negative effect upon compliance with laws, the exercise of
political authority becomes qualitatively more difficult.
Italy is the Western nation where civic indifference
is most important as a constraint upon political authority.
The Republic has survived for more than three decades against
both leftwing and rightwing challenges, but in an important
sense, it is a case of "survival without governing".2-' The
exercise of authority is in part inhibited by a mixture of
civic distrust and doubt that government can or will make
conditions better. Por example, in a 1977 DOXA survey, the
median respondent thought every possible combination of parties
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in government would be somewhat harmful, except for a 'black'
centre-right coalition, which was judged to lead to "unbearable
damage". At the elite level, indifference has been symbolised
since 1976 by the retention in Office of a Christian Democratic
government sustained by Communist Party policy of non sfiducia
(literally, 'not no confidence').
One long-term and indirect cause of Citizen indifference
is almost certainly the decline in compliance with the authority
of social institutions generally, including the family, the
church, and education, by comparison with the static, hierarchical
and agrarian Standestaat. The disjunetion of social and
political authority is illustrated by the abandonment of legis-
lation attempting to control public morality, once regarded as
a prime responsibility of government. The permissive society
demonstrates how indifferent Citizens can be to moral decrees
laid down by established authorities.
The decline in the ethos of organic solidarity may also
have reduced positive commitment to political authority, for
individuals are no longer encouraged to identify their individual
wellbeing with the nation's wellbeing. The growth of the wel-
fare State reflects a calculating individual desire for collective
insurance to meet individual needs as much as it expresses a
sense of collective Community care. The translation of organic
ties into the cash nexus is most evident in the growth of public
sector unions, with strike action threatened or taken by teachers,
nurses or doctors, people whose Professional values as well as
beamte Status would formerly have prevented such action.
Where government accepts responsibility for the manage-
ment of the national economy, inflation is also an indicator of
civic indifference. Inflation reflects a determination by
organised workers and business firms to raise money earnings by
their own actions, indifferent to government exhortations to
restrain wage and price increases. Economic groups will not
voluntarily comply with the exhortations of political managers
of the economy when they have no confidence that their
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exhortations will be effective. Scheuch notes that Citizen
indifference is found in Eastern Europe too: "The danger to
the Communist System is less that workers Start throwing stones
at tanks but that they go to sleep at their machines".27
The increasing volatility of voters in the past decade
is another sign of growing civic indifference to established
political institutions. Voters have shown a readiness to
abandon what were once thought to be stable and strong party
identifications without shifting support to anti-regime parties.
Among major Western nations, in the past decade only Germany
and Sweden have had electoral Swings confined within the normal
Parameters of a stable party System. In France and Italy,
moreover, any shift from government to Opposition could be a
weakening of support for the regime, because neither regime
has yet demonstrated that it can survive unscathed a transfer
of power to the left.
Ironically, growing civic indifference may reduce the
risk of value conflicts, for Citizens who have become indifferent
to the wishes of one group of political leaders will be less
disposed to put their trust in another. Insofar as indifference
makes government less effective, Citizens will have less immediate
Stimulus to repudiate a regime. Indifference is a cheap and
easy alternative to rebellion. An indifferent Citizen does not
need to take up arms against a regime; he simply closes his eyes
and ears to what it commands. The apathetic masses may sit out
power struggles within government, and turn the victor's Position
into a hollow triumph by shutting out a new government behind a
wall of indifference.
If Citizen indifference to government increases, this will
reduce government's effectiveness in managing economic resources.
Western governments depend upon the voluntary consent of individ-
uals and organisations rather than upon the coercive direction of
labour and capital, as in a command economy of Eastern Europe.
Indifferent Citizens will not have any incentive to co-operate
with a government that fails to achieve its major economic objectives.
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Increasing indifference can lead Citizens to reduce
resources available to government by tax avoidance and tax
evasion. Tax avoidance uses legal loopholes to reduce
liabilities on cash income, or even to demonetize labour. For
example, individuals can substitute their own untaxed do-it-
yourself efforts around the house for work by skilled craftsmen
who must be paid pre-tax gross wages from the post-tax income
of the householder. Tax evasion is a second means by which
individuals1 indifference to laws reduces government's
effectiveness. There is a cash incentive to do so, for a
pound of untaxed income is worth half again as much as a pound
of taxed income. Indifferent Citizens may not only indulge
in solitary fiddles, but also show readiness to co-operate with
others in tax evasion. If tax evasion becomes increasingly
acceptable in society, notwithstanding formal illegality,
effectiveness can be eroded at an accelerating rate, as the
risks of non-compliance decline with the increasing inadequacy
of sanctions against tax evasion.
VI POLITICAL AUTHORITY AS A META-PROBLEM
Political authority is by definition a meta-concept,
involving both regime effectiveness and populär consent. The
important question of the day is whether contemporary difficulties
of Western governments only concern effectiveness, or threaten
consent as well. If only effectiveness is in jeopardy, we may
see a decline in the organisational competence and resources of
government, but this would not of itself put political authority
at risk.
Most of the literature of ungovernability (like the
complementary literature about revolution and revolutionaries)
overestimates the probability of value conflicts leading to an
overt and explicit challenge to the authority of Western govern¬
ment. Such writings also tend to underestimate the prospect of
a regime surviving by coercion, supported by groups sufficiently
committed to the established values of the regime to sanction
all means necessary to prevent its overthrow. A noteworthy
feature of the rise of protest and terrorist activities in the
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past decade has been the widespread populär support for harsh
anti-subversive and anti-terrorist measures, even in a society
such as England, relatively untouched by politioal violence.29
To assert that revolution or anarchy will not happen
here does not mean that nothing will happen to political authority.
The possibility of Citizen consent turning to civil indifference
tends to be underestimated. The more that government tries to
organise Citizens, the more it risks demobilising them. The
decline of hierarchical social authority is a reminder that
manmade institutions are not immutable. Paradoxically, the
growth of civic indifference may itself insulate government from
overt value conflicts, as it reduces individual dependence upon
and interest in what government does. Concurrently, the insul-
ation of individual and group activities from government will
reduce political effectiveness at a time when politicians wish
to increase it.
In a very general sense, any problem of political
authority contains the seeds of its own resolution. If effect¬
iveness and consent drastically decline, then a regime is
repudiated; retrospectively, its failure appears inevitable.
If a regime survives, from a sufficiently abstract level of
System analysis it can be said to persist. It may persist
by trading off governmental effectiveness for consent, as in
Anglophone responses to the challenge of the Parti Quebecois
in Canada. It may persist by relying upon intermittently
effective coercion, as in Reginald Maudling's objective of
securing an 'acceptable' level of violence in Northern Ireland.
A regime may also persist by positively increasing resources
through a spurt of economic growth, or increasing the efficiency
of its own institutions.
Whatever the character of its political authority,
government goes on—but it may not go on in future as before.
The literature of ungovernability, for all its analytic
inadequacies and ideological biases, does address a fundamental
and often overlooked question of political science. We are
ready enough to analyse the rise and fall of regimes with the
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hindsight of history, or to commend philosophers for insights
about political authority in centuries when it was neither
absolute nor democratic. If political scientists are to remain
open to what is contingent in the present, there must be a
vocabulary and grammar of analysis that can go beyond concern
with particular political institutions, behaviour, or issues
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